Nada Kisic Kolanovic:

Muslims and Croatian Nationalism 1941 – 1945

From the foreword:
This book on Croatian-Muslim relations from 1941 to 1945 was written during the work on a scientific project of the Croatian Institute of History in Zagreb with the aim of treating the historical issues of the Independent State of Croatia as comprehensively as possible. In its ideal form, research into Croatian national discourse towards Muslims and Islam could be guided by the intention of finding elements of one’s own history in the history of others.
The discourse towards Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims was basically created in the ideology of the Party of Rights at the end of the 19th century, when, under the influence of Ante Starčević, the belief that Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were part of the Croatian ethnos strengthened. The radical nationalist elite in the NDH from 1941 to 1945 took this discourse to its extreme limits. With the expansion of the administrative and cultural network in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1941, Islam found itself at the core of Ustasha nationalism as part of Croatian cultural identity. Positive stereotypes towards Islamic cultural heritage were emphasized in order to forge a close bond between the Croatian state and Muslims. At the same time, the collapse of the NDH is a time lapse after which the idea of ​​the Croatian ethnicity of Muslims, which was put forward by successive generations of Croatian nationalists, fades. The category of “Croats of Islamic faith” has definitely passed into the realm of historiographical reflection.

Zdenko Radelic:

Croatia in Yugoslavia 1945 – 1991, from unity to division

From CROSBI:
The book presents almost half a century of Croatian history. The emphasis is on the political history of Croatia and on Croatian-Serbian relations in Croatia and Yugoslavia, and on the relationship between the republic and the federal state, that is, Croatia and Yugoslavia. The book is a combination of a textbook-type work with elements of a monograph on the national question. In the numerous tables, the most space is taken up by the results of the population census, demographic research, indicators of the national structure of state bodies and political organizations, and most of all the SK and the JNA. Statistical indicators of the economic and cultural development of Croatia and Yugoslavia, the relationship between the development and speed of development of the republics, as well as relations with neighboring countries are also presented. An important feature of the SFR Yugoslavia is its multinational composition and the constant confrontation between federalists and centralists. The conflict between centralism, which was most favored by Serbian political forces, and federalism, which was more supported by non-Serbs, constantly threatened the stability of the state. All nations went through different phases that intertwined with each other: phases of rapprochement and cooperation with other nations, even at the expense of the nation’s particularities or the role of the republics, or, on the contrary, phases of efforts to strengthen particularities and autonomy up to the ultimate demand for an independent state. Strong national identities, especially of the Croatian and Slovenian people, resulted in their constant insistence on greater independence. Among the Serbs and in Serbia, there were strong forces that advocated for the greatest possible role of the federal state and the state center. The cause lies in the spread of the Serbian nation in areas outside of Serbia, but also in the political power that Serbia and the Serbs inherited from the Serbian state in 1918. After 1945, this power was strengthened by a partisan movement in which Serbs were more represented in relation to their share in the population structure (Serbs from Croatia and BiH). As a rule, Serbs have a larger share in state and political institutions than other nations, but in the highest state and party bodies, the national structure was almost balanced. The reason for the high proportion of Serbs in state and political institutions lies in the more massive participation in the partisans, but also in a more positive attitude towards Yugoslavia compared to, for example, Croats (Croats are less represented in the SKJ, have a much larger emigration, and until 1981 were the most numerous political prisoners). The communists could not find the right model for resolving the national question, and they did not achieve greater economic progress and a society of social justice, nor a freer society compared to neighboring Western European countries. It turned out that the Western European political system was a model for many, including the reformist forces in SK. Socialism in Yugoslavia collapsed by itself and there was no serious party that would advocate for its preservation. The war was actually fought exclusively for a change of borders (Serbs) or for the independence of individual republics (Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks). Yugoslavia was created by fully formed nations, and the new state could not build a new Yugoslav nation that would be the original defender of Yugoslavia. The nations perceived Yugoslavia as an instrument to satisfy their special interests, and not as a common strategic goal. Every attempt by the authorities to implement national, cultural and economic unification was met with strong resistance, especially from Croatia and Slovenia. Conversely, every increase in rights was an incentive to seek an even greater role for nations and republics. The lack of a Yugoslav identity or, at least, common values ​​and the lack of will to harmonize differences were stronger than all integrative aspirations. In the second half of the 1960s, a strong movement was launched to strengthen federalism and democratization. However, JB Tito interrupted the process of democratization at the end of 1971, but not federalization, and introduced some confederal elements (parity, consensus and veto) into the 1974 Constitution. The independence of the Republic of Croatia was strongly encouraged when the Croatian People’s Party renounced the foundations of its activities, i.e. communism and Yugoslavism. The main causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia are: 1. the multinational composition and federalist system and the aspiration of Croatia and Slovenia for independence; 2. the strengthening of Greater Serbian forces, which found their leader in S. Milošević; 3. the disappearance of authoritarian rule and the dictatorship of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in both Yugoslavias authoritarian and dictatorial regimes were in power that never allowed free expression of the fate of Yugoslavia and its parts); 4. the deterioration of the economic situation; 5. the collapse of the world communist system and the end of the bloc division when Yugoslavia ceased to be a border country between two opposing political systems and military blocs.

Mario Jareb:

The Ustasha-Home Guard Movement from its inception until April 1941

From CROSBI:
The book covers the emergence and development of the Ustasha-Home Guard movement until the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia in April 1941. Particular attention is paid to the activities of the movement’s founder and leader, Dr. Ante Pavelić. Significant attention is also paid to the activities of Croatian Home Guard organizations in the USA and Argentina, and to the activities of the Home Guard component of the movement in general.

Z. Radelić, D. Marijan, N. Barić, A. Bing, D. Živić:

The creation of the Croatian state and the Homeland War

From CROSBI:
The important elements that influenced the disintegration of Yugoslavia were the disappearance of the authoritarian rule and dictatorship of the Serbian Communist Party, the aspirations of Croatia and Slovenia for independence, the strengthening of Greater Serbian forces in Serbia and Montenegro and in a large part of the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the collapse of the world communist system. With the loss of the political monopoly of the Serbian Communist Party over Yugoslav society, which was in a deep economic crisis, in conditions of political pluralism, forces emerged that maximized the different interests of the republics, so that resolving national problems and the issue of statehood became the main goals, especially in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. Croatia and Slovenia tried to achieve greater autonomy for their republics or, alternatively, an independent state, while Serbia was persistent in its efforts to maintain a state in which the Serbian people would be together, and in the maximum variant, united. During the 1980s, the intellectual elite of Serbia shaped its dissatisfaction with Serbia’s position in Yugoslavia. S. Milošević came to the head of the League of Communists of Serbia and tried to centralize Yugoslavia under Serbian domination. Theses about the threat to Serbs in Croatia are increasingly present. During 1989, Milošević’s mass movement was supported by a part of Croatian Serbs and the JNA, in which a significant part of the JNA officers were of Serbian nationality. Milošević set a condition that if individual republics wanted to remain in the loose Yugoslav community or intended to become independent, they could not keep areas inhabited by Serbs within their composition. Immediately after the HDZ victory, the SDS leadership, with the support of Belgrade, initiated the creation of a Serbian autonomous unit in Croatia. In fact, this was a matter of preparations for the future Croatian-Serbian demarcation. The areas covered by Serbian autonomy in Croatia were to remain in the new Yugoslav state under Serbian domination in the event of Croatian independence. Thus, in mid-1990, the Union of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika was founded, which would be reorganized into the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina by the end of the same year. In May 1991, the Serbs declared the separation of their autonomous regions from Croatia and decided to join the Republic of Serbia and remain in the future Yugoslav state. Faced with increasing pressure from the Serbian leadership and the JNA, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on June 25, 1991. In the summer of 1991, the aggression of the JNA and the rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia spread. The ethnic cleansing of the Croatian population and the destruction of Croatia occurred. By the end of 1991, the JNA and the Serbian rebels had established the borders of the future Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Croatia was internationally recognized at that time within the borders of the Yugoslav federation. The decision of the international community to recognize the Yugoslav republics and the principle that borders should not be changed by force prevented Belgrade from annexing the areas in Croatia controlled by the Serbs to the new Yugoslav state. The first part of the war, from May 1990 until the Sarajevo Agreement on January 2, 1992, was marked by the actions of the JNA as a Greater Serbian occupying force. Three phases can be distinguished. The first phase, from mid-May 1990 to early March 1991, when the JNA disarmed the Territorial Defense and implemented a new strategic deployment of its forces. In August 1990, the “log revolution” broke out, which occurred after the Croatian police attempted to remove some of the weapons of the reserve police from police stations in the area of ​​northern Dalmatia and Lika, inhabited by a majority Serb population, whose loyalty was increasingly distrusted. This was the reason for the Serbs to cut off the roads between Dalmatia and the rest of Croatia. The JNA formally acts as a factor that prevents interethnic conflicts, but in reality it protects the Serbian rebels and prevents the Croatian police from protecting the territorial integrity of Croatia. The second phase lasted from early March to early July 1991. Then the Serbian rebels tried to expand the SAO Krajina to areas where Serbs were in the majority or in large numbers. During this period, the JNA became their protector and participant in the same business. The third phase of the JNA and rebel Serb operations against Croatia began in July 1991. The Serbian Territorial Defense switched from intimidation to ethnic cleansing. Open crime proved more effective in achieving its primary goal: to ethnically cleanse the area of ​​Croats and other non-Serb populations. In mid-September, the JNA offensive against Croatia began with the aim of extracting troops from areas that were not part of the Greater Serbia plan and reaching its imagined borders. It abandoned its intention to defeat the HV and then accepted the option of occupying “Serbian” territory, but also the false explanation that it was acting to “prevent interethnic conflicts”. The biggest bite was Vukovar. It took the JNA two full months to conquer it. Aware of its failure, the JNA emphasized that Vukovar was the site of a decisive battle with the HV. This erroneous view was also accepted by a part of the Croatian public, which believes that had there been no Vukovar in 1991, there would have been no Croatian state. According to them, the fall of Vukovar was a consequence of the decisions of the Croatian leadership and that it could have had a decisive influence on all events, not only on the Croatian side but even on the side of the attackers. Mass desertions significantly reduced the combat readiness of the JNA. This facilitated attacks on barracks and the capture of JNA weapons and equipment. International recognition and the Sarajevo Armistice represent the end of one stage of the war. The second part of the war covers the period from the Sarajevo Agreement in January 1992 to December 1994. During this time, low-intensity conflicts alternated with longer intervals of peace. The focus of the crisis was transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The contribution of the HV was in providing assistance to Bosnian Croats and in preserving the Muslim-Bosniaks. With the operation on Maslenica in 1993, the HV demonstrated its power, and with the operation in the Medak Pocket, it drew the ire of part of the international community. In the second half of 1993 Smaller HV forces participated on the side of the Bosnian Croats in the conflict that was sparked by the Bosniak Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the year due to different concepts of the organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the desire for military supremacy. Although small in number, these forces played a significant psychological role, and on the international scene they influenced the equalization of Croatia with Serbia. In December 1994, the last period began, the period of liberation operations that lasted until the end of 1995. With Operations Flash and Storm, most of the occupied and rebelled areas were returned to the mother country. After Storm, a joint operational cycle of the HV, HVO and ABiH in Bosnia and Herzegovina followed. On 19 December 1991, the RSK, a rebel formation of Croatian Serbs, was proclaimed in Knin, which included the SAO Krajina, the SAO Western Slavonia and the Serbian Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem. The RSK was practically under the control of Serbia, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, without whose help it could not have survived. In late 1991 and early 1992, Zagreb and Belgrade accepted the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces in the areas in Croatia occupied by the JNA and the rebel Serbs. The JNA leadership and Milošević accepted this plan because they believed that the arrival of UN forces would secure their territorial gains in Croatia. Zagreb hoped that the UN peace plan would enable the return of Croatian refugees and displaced persons to areas under Serbian control, which were to be demilitarized under UN supervision. These would be steps in the reintegration of these areas into Croatia. It would turn out that the UN could not change the current situation, and indirectly helped prolong it. Only a ceasefire was achieved, and nothing was done for the return of Croatian displaced persons and refugees. The Serbs hoped for the Cyprusization of Croatia and the permanent maintenance of the existing situation. While the ceasefire and deployment of UN forces were ongoing in Croatia, the focus of the conflict in 1992 shifted to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to the involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community imposed economic sanctions on it. This was an important factor that would force Belgrade to reconsider its policy of unlimited aid to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would force Milošević to start pursuing a policy of compromise, giving up on maximalist Serbian goals. For the leadership of the rebel Serbs, the only acceptable solution was the separation of the RSK from Croatia and its unification with the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia and Montenegro into a new, unified Serbian state. S. Milošević understood that the international sanctions imposed on the FR Yugoslavia could only be lifted if the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted the initiative to end the war. Because of this, he would increasingly clash with the leadership of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milošević also understood that the RSK leadership should negotiate with Croatia, because the Serbs were increasingly exhausted after the renewed conflicts. In May 1995, the rebel leadership was dominated by those who advocated unification with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Knin rejected Plan Z4, which the international community had granted broad rights to Croatian Serbs in areas where they had been the majority population before the war. Thus, the rebel Serbs rejected the last option that separated them from complete defeat. In the RSK, the few remaining Croats were unprotected from terror, carried out by individuals and arbitrary groups, which the Krajina authorities often could not, and sometimes did not want to, stand in the way of. The difficult economic situation in the Krajina and the abandonment of numerous conscripts led to the weakening of its army and general apathy. The Krajina Serbs were disappointed in Milošević. Not because he had launched them into war against Croatia, but because he could not, or, as they mistakenly believed, did not want to help them anymore. A significant number of Serbs accepted the belief that the Croats were irreconcilable opponents and Ustashas with whom coexistence was impossible. That is why in 1995, when the rebel areas were mostly reintegrated into Croatia in the actions of the Croatian Army, the Serbian population left these areas, or the Krajina authorities evacuated the Serbian population. The weak resistance offered by the Croatian Army was caused by the much larger Croatian forces and their determination to achieve their territorial integrity, but also by the complete disunity that prevailed among the Krajina Serbs. After the destruction of the RSK, peaceful reintegration was agreed upon in late 1995, and Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Srijem were returned to Croatia in early 1998. The process of Croatia’s independence took place in extremely complex circumstances in the region, Europe, and the world. The defeat of communism and the affirmation of political pluralism in Eastern Europe resulted in the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The fall of the Berlin Wall led to the redundancy of the bipolar bloc constellation. Yugoslavia is losing the significance it had during the Cold War, and the main motive of the leading Western countries is to prevent the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state, which would be a dangerous precedent for redrawing borders in post-communist Europe. The disintegration of Yugoslavia occurs at a time when Western European countries are joining the European Community and strong global integration processes are underway. Such opposing tendencies influenced the assessment of the West, according to which national aspirations in Yugoslavia were potentially dangerous phenomena contrary to the goals of the CSCE. Faced with the national-communist ambitions of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia sought to internationalize the Yugoslav crisis. Independent statements were made by the democratically elected new authorities. The republics legitimized themselves as separate geopolitical entities. After the outbreak of war in Slovenia and Croatia, the sympathies of the international public were directed towards the victims. The policy of ethnic cleansing of the Serbian rebels, the JNA and paramilitary units from Serbia and Montenegro, and the determined resistance of the Croats resulted in the predominance of the principle of self-determination of peoples over the preservation of Yugoslavia. In relation to the Yugoslav crisis, the international community was divided. The USA retreated into a kind of isolationism, and the initiative for resolving the Yugoslav conflicts was taken over by the EC. Germany, Austria and the Vatican supported Slovenia and Croatia, while Great Britain and France were more inclined towards the Serbian-army bloc. Recognition of Croatia’s independence was conditional on the acceptance of the Vance Peace Plan and the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces in the occupied territories of Croatia. Despite gaining independence, Croatia did not achieve its full sovereignty due to the failure to implement the Vance Plan. From 1992 to 1994, Croatian policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was shaped by President F. Tuđman and Minister of Defense G. Šušak. Tactical negotiations with Serbs and Muslim-Bosniaks, which took place in parallel with the inconsistent peace initiatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, did not bring results; moreover, in the second half of 1992, a controversial conflict between Croats and Bosniaks broke out. Such a development of events corresponded to the Greater Serbian strategy of producing chaos, or the image of a “war of all against all” that was desired and to some extent encouraged by international mediators. The reason for this was the search for justification for inefficiency, or confirmation of the thesis of a civil war on ethnic and religious grounds – in which all parties to the conflict were jointly responsible and therefore military intervention would mean taking sides. Only after the gradual involvement of the USA in the peace process did the Croatian-Muslim alliance resume, military victories in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 occur. After Dayton, where an agreement was reached on the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region, Croatia, as a key American ally, enjoyed a favorable international position. From 1996 to 1999, the international community, led by the USA, exerted increasing pressure on Croatia to accept democratic standards and, in particular, active cooperation with the International Criminal Court in The Hague. This development of events led to a kind of isolation of Croatia, i.e. it slowed down its accession to the desired Euro-Atlantic integration. Direct war losses in Croatia amount to approximately 22,000 people, birth losses to approximately 9,500 unborn children, and migration losses to approximately 420,000 inhabitants. The balance of total demographic losses amounts to approximately 453,500 people. In the early 1990s, Croatia became a country with a very pronounced natural depopulation. From 1991 to 2001, a natural population decline of as much as 61,231 people was recorded. Natural depopulation, war and economic emigration, and human war losses all contributed to the decline in population. Between 1991 and 2001, the total population in Croatia decreased by 346,805 or 7.2% of the population in absolute terms, by 298,835 or 6.6% of the population in de facto terms, and by 292,216 or 6.1% of the population in de jure terms. However, due to immigration to Croatia, the overall depopulation was not as pronounced. Namely, 232,966 people immigrated to Croatia between 1991 and 2001, mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demographic losses also influenced changes in the ethnodemographic picture of Croatia. There was ethnic homogenization, especially the strengthening of the Croat ethnic majority. Despite the strong overall depopulation, the contingent of the Croat population in the total population of the country increased. The share of Croats increased from 78.10% to 89.63%, and the share of Serbs decreased from 12.16% to 4.54%. The increase in the share of Croats is a consequence of migration movements, especially the emigration of Serbs, and the absolute demographic growth of the Croatian population is a consequence of numerous refugee and immigrant flows of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. These immigrations replaced migration and other war losses of the Croatian population from Croatia. The increase in the number of Croats was also influenced by the assimilation of other ethnic groups and the de-Yugoslavization of part of the population.